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Anonymous communication systems have been around for
sometime, providing anonymity, enhanced privacy, and cen-
sorship circumvention. A lot has been done, since Chaum’s
seminal paper on mix networks, in preventing attacks able
to undermine the anonymity provided by these systems.
This, however, is a difficult goal to achieve due to the de-
centralized nature of these systems. In the end it boils down
to finding a subset of trusted nodes to be placed in critical
positions of the communication path. But the question re-
mains: ”How to know if a given node can be trusted?”. In
this paper we present a survey of a new research area which
goal is to exploit trust in social links to solve some of the
shortcomings of anonymous communication systems. Recent
research shows that by using social networking features it
is possible to prevent traffic analysis attacks and even detect
Sybil attacks.
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1. Introduction
In recent years a new research area emerged with the goal
of exploiting social networking features in order to solve
some of the short comings of anonymous communication
systems.
Anonymous communication systems are usually built as
peer-to-peer overlay networks, that rely on a community of
volunteers that are responsible for maintaining and running
the nodes that constitute the network. Users then make use
of this networks to remain anonymous, by creating a circuit,
or multi-hop path, through a set of selected relay nodes in
the network.
Volunteers are an important part of these networks, since
the degree of anonymity provided by such networks depends
on the number of nodes and their behavior in the network.
On the other end, the open nature of these networks allow
anyone willing to share some of its bandwidth to run a
relay node. This leaves a door open to malicious behavior
in the network, where an attacker can run one or several
relay nodes in the network in an attempt to undermine the
anonymity that these networks provide to their clients.
Attacks on anonymous communication systems have been
thoroughly studied, most of them being passive attacks
through traffic analysis. The most common attacks are the
predecessor attack [1], the intersection attacks [2], timing
attacks [3], and Sybil attacks [4]. These attacks can be
easily performed by controlling some specific relay nodes in
the circuits created by the clients. Timing attacks are more
critical in low latency anonymity networks and are extremely
difficult to detect do to their passive nature.
One way to thwart these attacks would be to gain some
information about the nodes in the network, in order to
establish trust relationships with a subset of nodes to relay
clients’ traffic. This model would substitute the actual model
in which nodes are chosen randomly.
For the purpose of this survey we define a social network
as a network of people that share a common goal and are
connected through bi-directional trust relationships.
In this survey we study current proposals that try to exploit
trust relationships of social links. The end goal varies, but the
main idea is to find out if it is possible to create anonymity
sets which are trusted, and offer protection against traffic
analysis.
Anonymity sets are sets of entities that have the same
probability of being the confused with the real client of an
anonymization network. The larger the anonymity set, the
highest the degree of anonymity provided by the set. Choos-
ing relay nodes from a trusted anonymity set, as opposed to
randomly chosen nodes, may result in smaller anonymity
sets but, as we will show, this does not necessarily mean
less anonymity.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we give
a brief overview of anonymous communication systems, in
section 3 we present an overview of the most common
attacks. In section 4 we present a survey of the work pre-
sented this far on how to exploit social networks to improve
anonymity, followed by the conclusions in section 5.
2. Overview of Anonymous Communication
Systems
In 1981 Chaum proposed a method to protect the identities
of communicating parties, called mix networks [5]. The
basic functionality of a mix network is to provide sender
and receiver anonymity by using proxy relaying servers.
Each message is encrypted in each proxy using public key
cryptography, resulting in a layered encryption.
Onion routing [6] is based on the mix networks proposed
by Chaum. It provides connections that are strongly resistant
to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Onion Routing
operates by dynamically building anonymous connections
within a network of real-time Chaum mixes [5].
An onion is a recursively layered data structure that
specifies properties of the connection at each point along the
route. Each onion router along the route uses its public key to
decrypt onions that it receives. This operation exposes the
cryptographic control information, the identity of the next
onion router, and the embedded onion. The onion router pads
the embedded onion to maintain a fixed size, and sends it
to the next onion router. After the connection is established,
data can be sent in both directions. Data from the initiator
is repeatedly pre-encrypted using the algorithms and keys
that were specified in the onion. As data moves through
the anonymous connection, each onion router removes one
layer of encryption as defined by the cryptographic control
information in the onion defining the route, so the data
arrives as plain text at the recipient
Tor [7] is a popular software that uses onion routing.
The Tor network is a distributed relay network that relays
arbitrary TCP streams over a network of relay nodes called
Onion Routers. Each onion router maintains a long term
identity key used to sign TLS certificates and maintain a TLS
connection to every other Onion Router. Each Tor client runs
a local software called Onion Proxy which is responsible
for fetching router lists, the current network state, establish
circuits across the network, and handle connections from the
user applications. Clients choose a path through the network
and build a circuit, in which each node in the path knows its
predecessor and successor, but no other nodes in the circuit.
Traffic flows down the circuit in fixed-size cells, which are
unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node and relayed
downstream.
Crowds [1] prevents a Web server from learning any po-
tentially identifying information about its clients, including
the clients’ IP address or domain name. Crowds works by
collecting Web clients into a geographically diverse group
called a “crowd” that performs Web transactions on behalf
of its members. A user joins the crowd by starting a process
in his local machine, called a “jondo”, during which it
is informed of the other current crowd members and the
other crowd members are informed of the new jondo’s
membership. Once admitted to the crowd, it can employ the
crowd to issue requests to Web servers in a way that prevents
Web servers and other crowd members from determining
who initiated those requests, by randomly choosing another
member of the crowd to which it redirects its requests. This
random request redirection is then performed several times
within the crowd, until a crowd member delivers that request
to the target Web server.
Freenet [8] can be seen as a social network where users
can anonymously share files, browse and publish Web sites
accessible only through Freenet, and chat on forums. Freenet
is decentralized, in order to make it less vulnerable to
attacks, and it allows an operation mode where users only
connect to their friends. Freenet stores documents and allows
them to be retrieved later by an associated key. The system
has no central servers and is not subject to the control of
any individual or organization. Freenet is implemented as a
peer-to-peer network of nodes that query one another to store
and retrieve files, which are named by location-independent
keys.
Anonymizer [9] is a tool that attempts to make activity
on the Internet untraceable by accessing the Internet on the
users’ behalf, hiding computer identifiers of source users.
Anonymizer acts as a trusted intermediary between its users
and the Web sites they are viewing, hiding the user IP
address, making it almost impossible for third parties to track
the sites that the user visits and build profiles of the user
activities on the Internet. It is also able to protect personal
information by redirecting users’ traffic through its secure
servers.
3. Common Attacks in Anonymous communi-
cation systems
The most common attacks know to anonymous commu-
nication systems are:
• Predecessor attack: In the predecessor attack, the at-
tacker tracks an identifiable stream of communications
over a number of rounds (path reformation). In each
round, the attacker simply logs any node that sends a
message that is part of the tracked stream. The attack
does not always require analysis of timing or size
of packets, but instead exploits the process of path
initialization.
• Intersection attack: An attacker having information
about which users are active at any given time can,
through repeated observations, determine which users
communicate with each other. This attack is based on
the assumption that users typically communicate with
a relatively small number of parties.
• Timing attack: In a timing attack, the attacker studies
the timing of messages moving through the system
to find correlations. It may be used by two or more
attackers to determine that they are in the same commu-
nication path to identify a stream of communications.
The predecessor attack was first presented by Reiter et
al. in the original Crowds paper [1]. The authors describe
an attack that allows an attacker to guess the initiator of an
anonymous connection based on the information about the
predecessor on the path of proxies.
In [10] Wright et al. proved that when a particular initiator
continues communications with a particular responder across
path reformations, existing anonymity protocols are subject
to attack. In the predecessor attack, the attacker tracks an
identifiable stream of communications over a number of path
reformations. In each path reformation, the attacker simply
logs any node that sends a message that is part of the tracked
stream.
The predecessor attack is a passive attack, and thus, it
is extremely hard to detect. Timing attacks may be used
with the predecessor attack in order to identify a stream of
communications. In conclusion the authors proved that as
long as attackers are selected uniformly at random to be
part of the active set, and sessions can be identified across
path reformations, the degree of anonymity of any sender
will degrade under this attack.
In their follow up paper [11] Wright et al. describe a
possible defense that comes from breaking the assumptions
of uniformly random path selection. They studied the effects
of non-uniform selection of nodes during path selection.
In [12] Syverson et al. had also realized that the predecessor
attack would fail, with the onion routing protocol, when the
first node in the path was a trusted node.
Wright et al. [11] perform a deep analysis on the use of
fixed nodes in the path selection, for both static systems
(nodes do not leave during the communication session), and
dynamic systems (nodes may leave during the communica-
tion session). They showed that if a fixed node is used in
the first position of the path, it protects the initiator from
ever being tracked by the attacker. When the attacker runs
the predecessor attack on a communication session for a
given receiver, they will see the fixed node as the initiator
of the communication session instead of the initiator itself.
The protection is similar for when the fixed node is at the
end of the path, since all communications to a given receiver
are hidden from the attackers by the fixed node. Ultimately
the initiator may use a fixed node for both the first and last
position on the path.
The authors also showed that in a dynamic system fixing
the first and the last node may not provide significantly
strong security over time when nodes leave the system
frequently, forcing the initiator to rebuild a communication
path.
These results provide a good metric when using a social
network. The system could advice the user of which nodes to
use at any given time of the day based on past history of the
availability of the nodes in the social network. Furthermore,
users of a social network would have an incentive to be
available, in order to to relay their friends’ traffic and shield
them from attackers.
In [3] Levine et al. focus in clarifying the threat posed to
low latency mix systems by timing attacks. They show that
timing attacks are a serious threat and are easy to exploit by
a well placed attacker in low latency mix-based systems like
onion routing, which offer no special provision to prevent
these kind of attacks. In such systems, if the first and last
mixes on the path are compromised, effective timing analysis
may allow the attacker to link sender with receiver.
A known defense against timing attacks is to use constant
rate cover traffic along the length of the entire path, in
order to reduce the correlation between the first and the last
mixes. The problem with this approach is that it does not
work when there are dropped packets, since they provide
holes in the traffic, making it easier to correlate a stream of
communications. To solve this problem the authors introduce
a new defense against timing analysis called defensive
dropping. They show that by randomly dropping some of the
cover traffic with sufficiently large frequency, the correlation
between the first and last mixes will be reduced.
Besides traffic analysis attacks, there is another attack that
is extremely hard to detect and prevent in distributed com-
puting environments, the Sybil attack [4]. In the context of
anonymous communication networks, a Sybil attack occurs
when several nodes, under the control or supervision of the
same entity, work in collusion, sharing information amongst
themselves in order to overthrow the anonymity provided
by the network, in order to reveal the communicating end-
points.
In [4] the author argues that it is practically impossible, in
distributed computing environments with no central trusted
authority, to vouch for a one-to-one correspondence between
entity and identity.
4. Exploitation of Social Networks for Improv-
ing Network Anonymization
In this section we provide an overview of recent work
on the use of social networking techniques to improve the
anonymity degree provided by anonymous communication
systems. Recent work focuses mainly in exploiting trust
relationships provided by social networks and how they can
be used in selecting trusted nodes in order to prevent traffic
analysis. There is also interesting work on reputation, which
could be useful for rating nodes in a network. From an
information theory point of view, it is shown that knowing
more information about a given node in the network does not
necessarily reduce anonymity. Another important application
of social networks is the detection of Sybil attacks.
4.1. Path Building
In [13] Puttaswamy et al. propose the use of social
links in order to improve anonymity through the introduction
of trusted nodes in the path. The authors focus on the
creation of paths using k-hop friends in the social network
as guard nodes. Assuming that the nodes in the anonymous
communication system belong to a social network, each
source is able to build a strong anonymous path prefaced
by hops in its social network.
The social links translate to a trust relationship established
between friend nodes in a social network. The source nodes
construct a communication path such that friends or friends-
of-a-friend are inserted into the path in order to shield the
source from being observed by passive attackers.
Finally the authors evaluate the security of this approach
in the presence of intersection and predecessor attacks, and
present an optimized path construction algorithm based on
cliques (groups of people with similar interests).
In [14] Danezis et al. present a novel architecture for
anonymous low-volume communications whose trust model
is based on a friend-of-a-friend architecture. In the proposed
architecture communications between friends are unobserv-
able and communications with further contacts in the net-
work are anonymous.
The use of a friend-of-a-friend architecture translates into
a smaller anonymity set, since the social network of a user
is only a subset of all the nodes in the network. Although
the anonymity set is smaller, an attacker has to infiltrate the
social circle of the user to perform an insider attacker.
In [15] Johnson, et al. propose a model of trust, in the
context of onion routing, in order to design path selection
strategies that minimize the probability of an attacker of
controlling the first and last node on the path, and thus
protecting against traffic analysis attacks.
They break the assumption that all nodes routing traffic
are equally trusted. There is usually information available
for those selecting paths in the network that can affect trust,
such as: who runs the nodes; what computing platforms are
being used by the nodes; how long and how reliably the
nodes have been running.
4.2. Protection Against Sybil Attacks
In [16] and the follow up paper [17], Yu et al. propose
a new protocol for defending against Sybil attacks without
relying on a trusted central authority. They assume a social
network where the nodes are identities in the distributed
system and the edges correspond to human established trust
relationships on the real world. The basic idea beyond the
protocol is that a malicious user can create many identities
but few trust relationships, which results in a social graph
where there are many connections between Sybil nodes and
few connections with honest nodes.
The social graph created by Sybil nodes exhibit a small
set of edges whose removal disconnects a large number of
nodes, the Sybil nodes, a behavior that is not presented in
social networks.
4.3. Information Theory
In [15] the authors pose some important questions, while
analyzing the implications of choosing nodes based on trust:
• Does using trusted nodes help to build a profile or
identify clients?
• Has using trusted nodes more often the disadvantage of
simultaneously reducing anonymity sets?
• What are the implication of using smaller but trusted
anonymity sets?
Diaz et al. develop work that help answer these questions
from an information theory context. In [18] the authors
evaluate the anonymity properties of an abstract anonymous
communication system of users, linked via a social network,
that send messages to their friends, focusing in how the
uncertainty in the attacker’s knowledge of user profiles
affects anonymity.
The authors study how the quantity, quality, and depth of
knowledge about the users relationships affect their degree
of anonymity, as well has the effect that the size of the social
network versus the size of the user social network has on
the degree of anonymity.
In [19] Diaz et al. answer the question of if the extra
information that is provided by the social network decreases
the degree of anonymity. The authors use Shannon entropy
as an anonymity metric, and show that the combination of
user profile information with observations at the communi-
cation layer does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the
attacker’s uncertainty, and that it may actually lead to higher
entropies.
Finally, in [20] Diaz et al. present a model to measure
anonymity of users associated with a profile. The main
goal of the model is to find a good compromise between
anonymity and usefulness of such systems. To have many
different profiles means that users are easily distinguishable,
and thus less anonymous. To have few different profiles
means that users are more anonymous but cannot be targeted
in an individual basis, which may not be a desirable property
when using social networks.
The model focus on anonymity at the data level where N
users, belonging to G groups, generate R requests using a
mix network at the communication level. In normal anony-
mous communication system with N active users, the max-
imum degree of anonymity is achieved when and attacker
sees all the users equally probable as being the originator of
a request (i.e., an anonymity set with N elements). In this
model the degree of anonymity depends on the distribution
of probabilities and not the number of users.
The model compares the information obtained by the
attacker after observing the system against the optimal
situation. It considers an attacker that can monitor all com-
munication lines of the system, knows the number of active
users and groups, the group a request originated from, and
the number of requests produced by each user.
4.4. Reputation
Although not directly related with anonymous commu-
nication systems, Mislove et al. [21] explore the use of
trust relationships such as social links, to thwart unwanted
communications. It does so by bounding the total amount of
unwanted communications that a user can produce, to the
number of trust relationships that the user possesses. Re-
ceivers are responsible for reviewing and classify unwanted
communications.
The proposed architecture relies on existing trust networks
to connect senders and receivers via chains of pairwise trust
relationships. It makes use of the fact that it is difficult for
a user to create arbitrarily many trust relationships, thus it
would be difficult for a malicious user to create enough trust
relationships in order to flood the network with unwanted
communications.
While not directly related to anonymous communication
systems, Hogg et al. [22] also exploit the use of social
networks for reputation systems. It has a relevant impact
for anonymous communication systems since reputation sys-
tems are also highly affected by collusion among participants
and Sybil attacks.
The authors present several benefits that social networks
can have on reputation systems:
• Rating based on individuals’ position in the social
network, without the need for explicit user intervention.
• Ratings based on the social group of the individual
being rated.
• Allow users to select among various filters gives flex-
ibility in using social networks which can complicate
attempts to distort the reported reputations.
• The use of social networks makes it more difficult
to spoof the system by creating false identities or
colluding in small groups.
• Large scale analysis of social networks can uncover
certain forms of group collusion.
While the work presented so far assumes that there already
exists a social network, and mainly focus on the use of trust
for path selection and attack prevention, this work provides
interesting results that could be used for the creation of the
social network by a new user. Reputation could be used as a
metric to rate nodes already in the social network to provide
enough information for new nodes joining the network to
bootstrap their social network.
5. Conclusions
We have shown several proposals that take advantage
of social networking features to enhance the anonymity
provided by anonymous communication systems, as well as
to prevent several known attacks that are still possible in
nowadays deployed systems.
While most of the work presented assumes that a social
network already exists, and focuses on trust and how it can
be used to build traffic analysis resistant communication
paths, there are other interesting proposals that deal with
reputation, which provides the means to rate the behavior
of nodes in the network. This particularly important in
bootstrapping a new social network, for instance, when a
new user joins the systems and needs to find some trusted
nodes to fit its needs.
Sybil attacks, which have been a long standing problem
in de-centralized systems that provide no means to verify
the identity of the entity running the nodes, can now be
prevented through the use of social networks.
As in any other social network, it is expected that, if
applied to anonymous communication systems, a profile
would be created by each user of the social network. While
it is true that this can have several implications in the users’
anonymity, and needs further research, it was shown through
a information theory context that the extra information
provided by a user profile does not necessarily reduce the
anonymity of the user.
As future work it would be interesting to map the require-
ments and design challenges of a social network on top of
the available anonymous communication systems.
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